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This study has two primary goals. These are the examination of the effect of risk tolerance on individuals'
demand for alcohol and second, the examination of the demand for alcohol by older adults over the
age of 55. The data sets employed are multiple waves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). While risk tolerance can impact the level of alcohol consumption,
it may also affect the sensitivity of demand to prices. There are parallels between the economist's and
the psychologist's concept of risk tolerance. Research on attitudes towards risk by psychologists is
part of a larger theoretical and empirical literature on personality traits. Psychologists have found risk
tolerance to be an important determinant of alcohol consumption. The empirical results indicate that
risk aversion has a significant negative effect on alcohol consumption, with the prevalence and consumption
among risk-tolerant individuals being six to eight percent higher.  Furthermore, the tax elasticity is
similar across both risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals. This suggests that tax policies may be
effective in deterring alcohol consumption even among those who have a higher propensity for alcohol
use. The significance of research on alcohol demand by individuals ages 55 and older is highlighted
by the increased potential for alcohol-related adverse consequences among this demographic group.
Comparing younger adults (ages 21-54) with older adults, responses to taxes and prices are higher
among the older sub-population. The tax elasticity is estimated at -0.05 for younger adults, compared
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I. Introduction 
Over 55 percent of the U.S. adult population are current drinkers.
1  While the overall prevalence 
rate has remained relatively stable over the past decade, there is some evidence that problematic 
drinking may be on the rise (Figures 1-3).  Data from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and 
Related Conditions indicate that the number of adults with an alcohol abuse or dependence disorder has 
increased by 14 percent between 1991-1992 and 2001-2002, adjusting for population growth (Grant et 
al., 2004).  There is extensive literature documenting the association between such excessive drinking 
and lost productivity, crime and violence, injuries, and premature mortality.
2  In 2000, there were a total of 
140,000 alcohol-attributable deaths, making alcohol consumption the third leading cause of mortality 
behind smoking and poor diet or inactivity (Mokdad at al., 2004).  Alcohol-related morbidity also imposes 
considerable strain on the public healthcare system.  Among the uninsured, hospital stays related to 
alcohol abuse comprise the fourth most common reason for hospitalization, and a quarter of all alcohol-
related stays involve Medicaid patients (Owens et al., 2007).  Estimates place the overall economic costs 
of alcohol abuse at $228 billion annually.
3  Amidst these concerns, the public sector has regulated the 
sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages through taxation, controls over distribution and availability, 
and use restrictions. 
While there is a large literature examining the demand for alcohol, there remain several gaps that 
may further inform on the effectiveness of public policies aimed at controlling alcohol consumption.  This 
study revisits the demand for alcohol, addressing some of these gaps and extending the literature in two 
novel aspects.  The first is the inclusion of risk preference in the demand for alcohol.  There is some 
common ground between how economists and psychologists view risk preference. This links the 
economic concept of risk to a larger literature on personality characteristics.  Cutler and Glaeser (2005) 
show that unobserved heterogeneity across individuals accounts for most of the variance in alcohol 
consumption and other unhealthy behaviors.  Typically, in studies of alcohol demand (as well as of other 
risky behaviors or health investments), out of necessity, such differences are subsumed in the residual 
without further consideration, due to lack of information.      
                                                 
1 Calculation from the 2006 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. 
2 See NIAAA (2000), and Parker and Auerhahn (1998) for a review of these studies.  
3 This estimate is based on the cost-of-illness approach conducted by Harwood (2000).  The estimated 
costs in 1998 amount to $184.6 billion, which in current 2006 dollars comprise $228 billion.     
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This study explicitly considers the confounding effect of preferences towards risk-taking in the 
alcohol demand function, utilizing unique data on risk tolerance from two large-scale population surveys: 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  Research on 
risk tolerance by psychologists links the economist’s concept to a larger theoretical and empirical 
literature on personality traits (Vlek and Stallen, 1980), and shows that attitude towards risk may also be 
an important predictor of alcohol use and other addictive behaviors.  Thus, incorporating risk tolerance in 
the demand function may improve the estimation process.   
Accounting for risk tolerance may also inform on any differential effects of prices and policy on 
alcohol use across heterogeneous sub-populations.  The most fundamental law in economics posits that 
increases in costs would be expected to lower alcohol consumption.  Various econometric studies have 
found confirmation of this negatively-sloped demand function for alcohol.  However, an estimation of the 
average price or policy response for the overall population may mask important differences across 
groups.  While many individuals regularly consume alcohol without imposing internal or external harm, the 
distribution of alcohol consumption in the U.S. is far from uniform.
4  Among current drinkers, the top 
quintile is responsible for over 65 percent of total alcohol consumption, and the top decile is responsible 
for 55 percent of total consumption.
5  Since it is immoderate or problem drinking that leads to high social 
costs, it is important to determine whether policies are affecting the behavior of target groups most likely 
to over-consume alcohol.  Dave (2005, 2007), for instance, shows that in the case of illicit drugs, hardcore 
users are less price-responsive relative to casual users, which may limit the effectiveness of further 
increases in drug prices towards reducing heavy drug use.  Data from the HRS indicate that individuals 
with the highest level of risk tolerance consume almost 30 percent more alcohol and are 32 percent more 
likely to binge, relative to the most risk-averse individuals.
6  Guiding effective public policy requires 
information on whether the impact of price-based policies differs across groups that significantly differ in 
their alcohol consumption.  Even if risk tolerance raises participation in risky behaviors, these individuals 
may still be relatively price-sensitive, in which case policies that raise the cost of consuming alcohol would 
also be effective in reducing use among the heavy users.  On the other hand, if tolerance towards risk 
                                                 
4 Indeed this skewness in the distribution of consumption among individuals is the motivation behind the 
widespread use of the two-part model with log transformation (Manning et al., 1995). 
5 Calculations are based on reported data for total number of drinks consumed in the prior month by 
individuals ages 21 and older, from the 2005 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.    
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tempers the effect of prices, then broad cost-based policies may have limited efficacy and more targeted 
interventions may be necessary.  From an exploratory standpoint, this analysis will also shed light on 
whether and if so, by what extent, price responsiveness varies across a fundamental indicator of 
personality.  There have been no prior studies that have investigated the effects of risk tolerance in the 
individual’s alcohol demand function. 
The second contribution of this study is a separate focus on older adults.  Incorporating 
consistent information from the PSID and the HRS allows separate analyses for adults (ages 21-54) and 
older adults (age 55+).   While alcohol consumption generally declines over the life cycle, younger cohorts 
have had increasing prevalence of alcohol consumption particularly at older ages (NIAAA, 2000).  For 
instance, comparing individuals aged 60 years and older, drinking prevalence is 26.7 percent among 
those born between 1924 and1930 versus 36.2 percent among those born between 1931 and 1940.  
Figures 1-3 also show that overall alcohol prevalence as well as heavy drinking has generally trended 
upwards among older adults over the past decade.  Surveys conducted in health-care settings generally 
find an increasing prevalence of alcohol-related disorders among the older demographic, in contrast with 
general population-based surveys.  Looking at elderly hospital admissions, for example, 6 to 11 percent 
exhibit symptoms of alcoholism.  The rate increases to 14 percent among elderly hospital emergency 
department admissions (Council on Scientific Affairs, 1996).   
In addition to general alcohol-related harms, older individuals may be particularly susceptible to 
other adverse consequences.  For instance, aging can increase sensitivity to alcohol-related health 
effects due to a reduced tolerance for alcohol (NIAAA, 1998).  Equal amounts of alcohol consumption 
lead to a higher blood alcohol concentration (BAC) as the individual ages due to a decrease in the 
amount of body fluid in which to dilute the alcohol.  Reduced tolerance also induces the onset of alcohol-
related effects, such as compromised cognitive and behavioral functioning, at lower doses.  Higher use of 
prescription medications among the elderly further raises the likelihood of adverse alcohol-related 
interactions.  Pringle et al. (2005) find that among adults ages 65 and older, 77 percent of prescription 
drug users are exposed to medications with potentially adverse interactions with alcohol.  Furthermore, 
among users of such alcohol-interactive drugs, 19 percent reported concomitant alcohol use.  Even after 
adjusting for more intensive use of medications, older adults (65+) account for a disproportionately large 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Binge drinking in the HRS is defined as consuming 4 or more drinks in a single occasion.    
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share of adverse drug reactions (Moore et al., 2007).  Despite these concerns, there is very limited 
research on alcohol use among the older sub-population.  Broad population-based studies show that 
alcohol taxes and prices deter use.  However, it is not clear whether certain groups of interests have 
higher or lower price sensitivity.  The aging of the demographic combined with an increased potential for 
alcohol-related harms underscores the relevance of examining the demand and price-sensitivity for older 
adults. 
II. Relevant  Studies 
  An extensive empirical literature by economists has examined the impact of the price of alcoholic 
beverages on consumption.  A review of older studies, based on individual-level data, suggests that the 
demand for alcohol is responsive to shifts in prices though there is considerable variation in estimates of 
the price elasticity (Leung and Phelps, 1993).  More recent studies confirm this negative price response, 
and further point to important differences among certain demographic groups.   Manning et al. (1995), 
based on data from a supplement to the 1983 National Health Interview Survey, find that the median 
drinker is price responsive, with an estimated elasticity of -1.19; however, the elasticity significantly 
decreases in magnitude for the heavy drinkers.  In fact, at the 95
th percentile of drinkers, they cannot 
reject the hypothesis that demand is perfectly inelastic.  Kenkel (1996), using the same data, further 
shows that the price responsiveness varies considerably and positively with respect to drinking-related 
health information.  Heavy drinking by the most-informed consumers is much more price elastic than 
moderate drinking, while the estimated price elasticities of heavy drinking for the least-informed 
consumers are not statistically significant.  Chaloupka and colleagues (2002) provide a good review of the 
literature looking at the effects of alcohol prices on consumption and indicators of alcohol abuse such as 
motor vehicle fatalities, adverse health effects, and violence and crime. 
  Studies have also considered specific demographic sub-populations and found differences, 
though not always consistently, with respect to the price sensitivity.  Laixuthai and Chaloupka (1993) 
employ data from the 1982 and 1989 Monitoring the Future (MTF) surveys of high school seniors.  They 
find that for both years, higher beer excise taxes significantly reduced the frequency of drinking as well as 
the probability of heavy drinking.  Using longitudinal data on youths ages 17-29 from the MTF surveys, 
Grossman et al. (1998) apply the rational addiction paradigm of Becker and Murphy (1988) to estimate a 
long-run price elasticity of -0.65.  Chaloupka and Wechsler (1996) investigate college drinking patterns    
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and find significantly negative price effects for underage drinking and binge drinking among female 
students.  However, no effects are found for males.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) utilize data from the 
National Household Surveys of Drug Abuse (1988, 1990, and 1991) to estimate differential price 
responses for various demographic groups.  They find similar price elasticities for the frequency of past 
month alcohol use among males and females; however, blacks were found to be less sensitive relative to 
other races and especially whites.  Cook and Moore (2001) study youth drinking patterns from the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) 1979 cohort.  Their results indicate that among youths 
between the ages of 17 to 32, the excise tax on beer has a significant deterrent effect on past month 
participation though not on bingeing.  For some specifications, elasticity estimates suggest that females 
may be more price-sensitive.  Saffer and Dave (2006) study alcohol consumption among adolescents 
based on the MTF and the NLSY-97 data.  They find that measures of alcohol participation and bingeing 
are responsive to the weighted price of alcohol.  Analyses stratified on various demographic 
characteristics suggest that the elasticity estimates are larger for females and for whites.   While the 
literature has focused on the overall population and youths, there have been no studies that have 
specifically investigated the price response of older adults. 
  According to NIAAA (2000), alcohol use and abuse are best viewed as functions of a combination 
of genetic, psychological and social influences.  Although the association between psychiatric disorders 
and alcohol has been widely researched by psychologists (Kessler et al., 1996), there has been little work 
in this area by economists.  Only one study to date has considered differential demand responses with 
respect to mental disorders.  Saffer and Dave (2005) estimate the effect of mental illness on the demand 
for addictive substances, including alcohol participation.  They show that individuals with a history of 
mental illness are 26 percent more likely to consume alcohol.  Accounting for the endogenous selection of 
mental illness, individuals diagnosed with a mental disorder in the past year or in their lifetime are also 
found to be more sensitive to alcohol prices relative to healthy individuals.  The price elasticity for 
individuals with a recent or lifetime mental illness is estimated at -0.49 to -0.63, versus -0.38 for 
individuals with no mental illness.   
  There has been no research that has integrated personality traits into the economist’s alcohol 
demand function.  Specifically, no prior study has considered the differential response of demand to price 
variations, across measures of risk tolerance.  Research by psychologists has linked the economist’s    
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concept of risk tolerance to broader aspects of personality.
7  For instance, Cloninger’s (1987) 
tridimensional personality scale employs as its foundation characteristics measuring an individual’s 
propensity towards “harm avoidance,” “novelty seeking,” and “reward dependence” – which closely 
resemble the economist’s concept of risk tolerance.  Each of these traits is considered moderately 
heritable, developmentally and situationally stable, and associated with specific neural systems that 
mediate different types of stimulus-response relationships (Menza et al., 1993).  Thus, these components 
of risk tolerance reflect an underlying biogenic structure of personality that may interact with 
environmental stimuli. 
  Several empirical evaluations have applied the tridimensional model to substance-abusing 
populations (Howard et al., 1997).  Individuals who score high on “novelty seeking” and low on “harm 
avoidance” are more likely to have early onset of alcohol abuse, for instance.  These individuals are 
defined by Cloninger as confident and danger-seeking, and correspond well to economist’s classification 
of individuals who are highly tolerant of risk.  While psychologists have long studied the “addiction-prone 
personality,”
8 this study is the first to incorporate measures of risk tolerance into estimates of the alcohol 
demand function and in relationship to the individual’s response to economic factors. 
III. Analytical  Framework 
One objective of this study is to assess how risk tolerance affects an individual’s alcohol use and 
their response to shifts in the price of alcohol.  Since alcohol is ultimately a consumer good, this question 
can be framed within the context of utility theory with uncertain income.   
(1)  U = f ( A , Y; e ) 
Equation 1 specifies an individual’s utility as a function of alcohol consumption (A) and income Y that can 
be used to consume other goods, with exogenous preference parameter (e).  The marginal utility of 
alcohol consumption is positive and diminishing.
9  The positive outcomes associated with alcohol use 
                                                 
7 Research on risk preference by psychologists (Vlek and Stallen, 1980) and by economists (Rabin, 2002) 
also tends to overlap to some degree. 
8 A recent work of the same title (Barnes et al., 2000) provides an empirical study of the etiology of 
alcohol and drug abuse and personality.  Findings suggest that there is a causal link between personality 
traits and the onset of alcohol abuse. 
9 The utility function may also be extended to incorporate the addictive stock accumulated through past 
alcohol consumption.  This stock has a negative effect on current utility, reflecting tolerance or harmful 
addiction, and a positive effect on the current utility, reflecting the reinforcement of past consumption on 
current consumption.  Expanding the model does not alter the basic conclusions with respect to risk 
tolerance.    
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include intoxication and stimulation of the dopamine receptors in the brain’s pleasure center.  Moderate 
alcohol use can also have positive health effects and improve social functioning.  Short-run negative 
consequences of drinking include dehydration and gastrointestinal disorders, reduced productivity, an 
increased probability of accidental injury including automobile accidents, perpetrating or being a victim of 
violence or crime, and sexual abuse.  Long-run effects can also include addiction, loss of employment, 
problems in interpersonal relationships, and more serious health consequences such as cirrhosis of the 
liver and obesity (NIAAA, 2000).   
The role of an individual’s tolerance towards risk in the alcohol demand function stems from the 
fact that these outcomes are probabilistic rather than known with certainty.  The potential positive and 
negative effects of alcohol consumption map into a potential set of gains and losses in income or utility.  
The consumer maximizes an expected utility function that takes into account these subjective 
probabilities and the set of gains and losses.
10  Concavity of the expected utility function with respect to 
income is equivalent to risk aversion, and the more concave (that is, the higher is the degree of 
diminishing marginal utility of income) the more risk averse is the consumer.
11  Intuitively, a risk-averse 
individual places a higher weight on the loss in income than on an equal sized gain.  As the expected 
utility function becomes less concave (more convex), the degree of risk aversion declines and the 
individual becomes more tolerant of risk.  In this case, the weight attached to the potential loss from 
alcohol consumption declines, and conversely is shifted towards greater weight on the potential gain from 
alcohol consumption.  Ceteris paribus, it follows from expected utility maximization that individuals who 
are more risk tolerant will have a higher demand for alcohol.  Simple correlations generally confirm this 
prediction.  Andrucci et al. (1989) and Gerra et al. (1999) show that individuals with high levels of novelty-
seeking and low levels of harm-avoidance are more likely to abuse substances.  Similarly, Barsky et al. 
(1997) link increased tolerance towards risk with higher alcohol consumption.  However, these studies do 
not estimate this link within a demand framework, and do not control for other factors that are correlated 
with alcohol use and may be confounding this relationship.   
                                                 
10 For instance, if the individual will experience a decline in income by among L from adverse reactions to 
alcohol consumption realized with subjective probability p, then the following expected utility function is 
maximized:  p*U(Y – L) + (1-p)*U (Y).   
11 Risk aversion is therefore a function of the second derivative of the expected utility function, though it 
needs to be normalized in order to make the consumer’s behavior invariant to transformation of the 
expected utility function.  The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion normalizes the second derivative by    
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The degree of risk aversion may also affect an individual’s response to alcohol price and policy.  
Since risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to consume alcohol, and may do so at immoderate levels, it 
is important to determine whether public policy prescriptions of higher alcohol taxes would be effective for 
this high-use group.  In this respect, theory is ambiguous.  Generally, price sensitivity depends inversely 
on the magnitude of the second derivative of the utility function with respect to alcohol consumption, the 
rate at which marginal utility diminishes.  The faster the rate of decrease, the less price-sensitive is the 
consumer.  Since, in its general form, income (and other goods) can interact with alcohol consumption in 
the utility function, risk aversion may therefore have an effect on the price elasticity of demand.  If 
marginal utility of alcohol use diminishes rapidly for risk-tolerant individuals, then they may be less 
responsive to price.  On the other hand, risk tolerant consumers may have a higher price elasticity if their 
rate of diminishing marginal utility is lower.  Studies, based on the Cloninger tridimensional scale, have 
generally found that two different types of temperaments have a higher propensity for alcohol abuse 
(Howard et al., 1997).  Type I temperaments have low novelty-seeking, but high harm-avoidance and 
reward-dependence characteristics.  Type 2 temperaments have high novelty-seeking traits but score low 
on harm-avoidance and reward-dependence.  Thus, it is difficult to say a priori how marginal utility 
diminishes for these consumers, and therefore how they would react to shifts in costs.  Due to this 
theoretical ambiguity, the nature of the price response for risk tolerant versus risk-averse individuals 
remains an empirical question. 
Empirical Models 
The following specifications will be estimated based on the above discussion.
12 
(2) Aist = B0 + B1 Pst + B2 Ris + B3 Yist + B4 Xist + B5 Hist + μs + νt + εist 
Equation (2) represents the alcohol demand function for the i
th individual residing in state s at year t.  
Alcohol consumption (A) depends on prices and policies (P) regulating the sale and consumption of 
alcohol, income (Y), and other socio-demographic factors (X) such as age, gender, race, and education, 
with ε representing a classical error term.  An indicator (R) that dichotomizes individuals as risk averse or 
risk tolerant will also be included.  Alternative models that contain measures of physical and mental health 
                                                                                                                                                             
dividing it by the first: -U’’(Y) / U”(Y). 
12 In the case of dichotomous alcohol participation, models will be estimated via probit.  Where measures 
on intensity of use are available, models will be estimated for log use conditional on participation, within a 
two-part modeling framework.  Standard errors are adjusted for correlation at the individual level, using    
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status (H) are also estimated.  Studies have found that mental illness raises participation in substance 
use including alcohol, consistent with the self-medication hypothesis (Saffer and Dave, 2005).  Certain 
physical ailments (diabetes, gastrointestinal disorders) or even general poor health may also reduce the 
individual’s demand for alcohol.  Since the key policy instrument (alcohol taxes) vary at the state level 
over time, it is important to control for unobserved state-specific factors and time trends.  Specifications 
are therefore estimated with a vector of state (μ) and year (ν) fixed effects.
13   
  In order to allow for differential price responses across risk-tolerant and risk-averse individuals, 
the above specification can be expanded to include an interaction between the price measure (P) and the 
indicator of risk tolerance (R).  In some specifications where limited sample size is an issue, differential 
price responses are estimated using such an interaction effect.  These specifications restrict the effect of 
other factors to be the same across groups, while allowing the price effect to differ.  However, in general, 
a more flexible formulation based on sample stratification is followed to allow for differences in all 
parameters across risk tolerance. 
(3) Aist | Risk Averse   = B0 + B1 Pst + B2 Yist + B3 Xist + B4 Hist + μs + νt + εist 
(4) Aist | Risk Tolerant = α0 + α1 Pst + α2 Yist + α3 Xist + α4 Hist + γs + δt + ηist 
Comparison of the parameters (B1) and (α1) informs on whether risk-tolerant individuals are more or less 
sensitive to price changes, relative to risk-averse individuals.   
IV. Data 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
  The empirics are based on two large-scale population surveys, the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics and the Health and Retirement Study.  The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a 
longitudinal study of a representative sample of individuals and their family units, conducted by the 
Institute of Social Research.  Originating in 1968, the PSID core sample combines the Survey Research 
Center sample, which is a cross-sectional national sample, and the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
sample, which is a national sample of low-income families.  From 1968 till 1996, individuals from families 
                                                                                                                                                             
STATA’s cluster option.   
13 Longitudinal data from the PSID and the HRS also permit the estimation of person fixed effects models.  
However, since the policy variables are measured at the state level, including individual fixed effects 
would deplete degrees of freedom and inflate the standard errors.  As long as the policy variables at the 
state level are orthogonal to the individual, omitting the person-specific fixed effects will not affect the 
consistency of the estimates.  Furthermore, since the risk aversion instrument is time-invariant, this also    
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in the core sample were interviewed every year, including adults as they have grown older and their 
respective family units.  From 1997, data collection became biennial.  A number of other changes were 
also made, including a reduction in the core sample and the introduction of a refresher sample of post-
1968 immigrant families and their adult children, in order to keep the sample representative. 
  A dichotomous indicator for current alcohol consumption is constructed from the PSID data.  
Among individuals between the ages of 21 to 54, 66 percent are current drinkers; the prevalence 
decreases with age as evidenced in the older cohort from the Health and Retirement Study.  Detailed 
information on various health measures is also available.  An index of functional difficulties associated 
with bathing, dressing, eating, walking, and getting outside is created and ranges from zero to five.  
Dichotomous measures are also constructed for lifetime diagnoses of hypertension, diabetes, heart 
disease, and stroke.  A depression scale, ranging from zero to four, measures the number of depression-
related symptoms experienced in the past month.  Indicators for age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital 
status, and education are defined and included in the models.   Measures of labor force attachment are 
also constructed, capturing whether the individual is currently working (part time or full time), unemployed, 
or retired.  Additional variables are defined in Table 1.   
Health and Retirement Study 
  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan.  It is an ongoing longitudinal study, which began in 1992 and is repeated 
biennially.
14  Prior to 1998, the HRS cohort included individuals born between 1931 and 1941, and a 
separate Study of Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) included individuals born 
before 1924.  Since 1998, AHEAD respondents have been contacted as part of a joint data collection 
effort with the HRS, and the sample frame was also expanded by including cohorts born between 1924 
and 1930 and those born between 1942 and 1947.  As older adults are over-represented in the HRS, this 
is an ideal dataset, in terms of sample size and available information on correlates of alcohol use, to 
study alcohol demand for this segment of the population.  The present analysis utilizes the first seven 
waves, spanning 1992 through 2005, and restricts the sample to older adults ages 55 and over.  This 
yields a maximum sample size of about 107,000 person-wave observations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
precludes controlling for individual fixed effects in the preferred specifications.   
14 Blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents are oversampled.  Sampling weights are provided to adjust for    
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  Both dichotomous and continuous measures of alcohol use are constructed.  The dichotomous 
indicator measures whether the individual currently participates in drinking.  The individual is also asked 
about their frequency and intensity of alcohol consumption.
15  Based on these questions, a measure of 
the average number of drinks consumed daily is obtained.  Approximately 35 percent of older adults are 
current drinkers.  Among those who drink, slightly less than one drink is consumed daily on average.
16  
The HRS is administered for the specific purpose of studying life-cycle changes in health and 
economic resources, and includes detailed information on various health outcomes.  A composite index is 
defined to measure difficulties associated with mobility.  It ranges from zero to five and indicates 
difficulties in walking one block, walking several blocks, walking across a room, climbing one flight of 
stairs, and climbing several flights of stairs.  Additional indicators are defined separately for whether the 
respondent reports that he or she has been diagnosed with the following illnesses:  diabetes, heart 
disease, stroke, and high blood pressure.  The HRS contains a depression scale, as defined by the 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies (CES), which ranges from zero to eight.  This CESD score measures 
the sum of adverse mental health symptoms for the past week (listed in Table 1).  Studies have confirmed 
the validity and reliability of the CESD scale as a screening instrument for the identification of major 
depression in older adults (Irwin et al., 1999).   
  Measures are selected from the HRS to ensure consistency with variables constructed from the 
PSID.  Indicators for age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, and education are defined and included 
in the models.   Measures of labor force attachment are also constructed, capturing whether the individual 
is currently working (part time or full time), unemployed, or retired.  Real income is calculated for each 
individual from all available sources including earnings, pension, supplemental security, social security 
                                                                                                                                                             
unequal probabilities of sample selection. 
15  In waves 1 and 2, the respondent is asked directly about the number of drinks that they consume per 
day, in general.  The responses are categorical, which are coded at their midpoints and top-coded at five 
or more drinks.  For waves 3-7, the respondent is asked about the number of days that they consume 
alcohol in an average week, and the number of drinks consumed on average when they drink.  The 
responses to these questions are continuous.  To ensure consistency with the questions in waves 1 and 
2, responses in waves 3-7 are also top-coded at 5 or more drinks daily.  Very few drinkers are in the top 
category (2.25 percent).  While the change in the questions after wave 2 is a potential concern, restricting 
the sample to waves 3-7 does not significantly alter the results.  Estimating a spline model by interacting 
the price measure with a dichotomous indicator to represent the break also yields similar estimates to 
those reported.  
16 A standard drink is considered to be the amount of beverage containing approximately 0.5 ounces of 
alcohol.  This is about 12 ounces of beer, 5 ounces of wine, or 1.5 ounces of distilled spirits.    
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retirement, and other government transfers deflated by the consumer price index.
17  Description of these 
covariates is provided in Table 1. 
Risk Tolerance Module    
  A module probing the individual’s tolerance towards risk is administered to 11,707 individuals in 
the first wave of the HRS and 8,125 entrants into the study in subsequent waves.  Measures of risk 
aversion are obtained from a series of questions involving willingness to gamble over lifetime income with 
varying probabilities.  The module has undergone considerable testing in order to minimize 
misunderstandings and additional complications in interpretation, and to ensure consistency with the 
economist’s concept of risk preference.  Barsky et al. (1997) provide a detailed analysis of the survey 
instrument.  Answers to the questionnaire separate the individuals into four distinct categories of risk 
preference, ranging from the most risk tolerant to the most risk averse.
18  The majority of respondents 55 
years and older (64 percent) can be classified in the most risk-averse category, with 15 percent 
comprising the second most risk-averse group, and 21 percent divided equally among the two least risk-
averse categories.  In order to maximize sample sizes and ensure consistent comparison in the stratified 
models, an indicator for the most risk-averse category is included in the specifications.  When stratifying 
across risk tolerance, the most risk-averse individuals (64 percent) are compared to the other three 
categories.
19    
  One validation of the HRS risk tolerance instrument comes from relating it to behaviors that would 
be expected to vary with an individual’s propensity to take risks (Barsky et al., 1997).  Data from the HRS 
indeed show that more risk-averse individuals participate less in risky behaviors such as smoking and 
drinking.  Risk-averse individuals would also be expected to take steps to insure themselves;  this is 
confirmed by the simple means, which indicate that the prevalence of health insurance and life insurance 
                                                 
17 Models were also estimated with alternate measures, including net household income.  Since this 
measure is missing for a larger proportion of the sample, reported specifications control for individual 
income instead.  Results between the two measures are similar. 
18 The categories can be ranked in order, without any functional form restrictions on the preference 
parameters or the utility function.   
19 Results are not qualitatively affected in comparing the most risk-averse (64 percent of the sample) with 
the most risk-tolerant (11 percent), excluding the middle two categories.  The direction of the effects 
remains the same, though the magnitude of the differences is expectedly larger since the comparison 
involves the two extreme categories of risk tolerance.  While the risk module has undergone testing 
before being included in the HRS, interpretation or misreporting may lead to errors in classifying an 
individual into the exact risk category.  However, in dichotomizing the risk measure into risk aversion 
versus risk tolerance, such classification errors are minimized.    
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is higher among those who are risk averse, relative to those who are more risk tolerant.  For instance, in 
wave 1, the difference in coverage rates between the most risk averse and the most risk-tolerant 
individuals (prior to obtaining Medicare) is six percentage points.  Barsky et al. (1997) also look at self-
employment and immigration status.  One of the largest voluntary risks is self-employment since the 
income stream of the self-employed generally has a higher variance that that for salaried employees.  
Similarly, immigration into the U.S. and migration within the U.S. may also be indicative of a more daring 
personality.  In the HRS, self-employment, immigrant status, and region of residence (western U.S.) are 
significantly correlated with risk tolerance in the expected direction.  Risk tolerance is also found to be a 
significant predictor of the composition of household assets.  More risk-averse respondents have a higher 
share of their portfolio in relatively safe assets, such as Treasury bonds and savings accounts, whereas 
more risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to place their assets in equities.   
  Since virtually all respondents in the HRS only partake in the risk module once, the measure of 
risk tolerance is time-invariant.  This is not a concern since studies have shown that personality traits 
associated with risk tolerance are generally stable, have a biogenic basis, and have some constancy 
across various situations (Howard et al., 1997; Menza et al., 1991).  A very small subset of individuals 
(n=717) responded to the module in both waves 1 and 2.  Barsky et al. (1997) show that the distribution of 
risk aversion is relatively stable for these individuals across both waves.   
  The PSID contains the identical risk tolerance module as the HRS.  This allows a comparison of 
estimates for a large representative sample of older individuals from the HRS with adults from the PSID, 
based on equivalent sets of specifications.  The PSID analysis is restricted to three waves that contain 
information on the respondent’s alcohol use: 1999, 2001, and 2003.  While about 6,900 households 
overall (comprising of about 11,000 individuals) are surveyed in 1999, the risk tolerance module is 
administered to a subset of individuals.  For specifications based on risk tolerance, the sample size is 
limited to 9,700 person-wave observations.   
  Based on the PSID, about 43 percent of adults between the ages of 21 and 54 can be 
categorized as the most risk-averse.  This is less than the rate in the HRS, though the variation can be 
attributed to the difference in the age groups and other sample characteristics.  When restricting the PSID 
sample to individuals 55 years of age and older, the prevalence of risk aversion (62.3 percent) is much    
  14
closer to that found in the HRS (63.9 percent).  The consistency of these rates across two independent 
samples is validating.  Appendix 1 provides added information on the risk preference module. 
Appended Variables 
  Information on the respondent’s state of residence is available in the PSID and made available to 
this project for the HRS.  Policy measures affecting the sale and consumption of alcohol are merged to 
records in both datasets based on the interview period and the state of residence.  As a proxy for the cost 
of alcohol, the state excise tax on beer is utilized for several reasons.
20   First, focusing on the state 
excise tax bypasses the simultaneity between price and demand.  Changes in the state-level excise tax 
are plausibly exogenous to the individual’s alcohol demand, often changing in response to the state’s 
budgetary needs.  Excise tax rates on wine and liquor are poor proxies for the prices of wine and liquor in 
control (monopoly) states because such states derive most of their revenue from the sale of wine and 
liquor from the price markups rather than from the excise taxes.  Beer, however, is sold privately in 
monopoly states.  Changes in excise tax rates within states over time are also strongly correlated with 
changes in the respective alcohol beverage price.  A one-cent increase in the excise tax has been shown 
to raise the price by at least as much (Kenkel, 2005; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002).  Excise tax 
rates on beer, wine and liquor are also highly correlated as are their prices (ρ > 0.5).  Thus, the beer tax 
provides a good proxy for the cost of alcohol while bypassing colinearity issues with including multiple tax 
rates in the specification.  While some uniformity has emerged in certain other alcohol-related regulations 
such as the minimum purchase age or blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, there remains substantial 
variation in alcohol excise taxes.   States have enacted widely differing rates, leaving considerable room 
for policy manipulation.  For instance, the beer tax currently ranges from $0.02 per gallon in Wyoming to 
$1.07 per gallon in Alaska.  Thus, estimates of the tax elasticity also provide a direct estimate of the effect 
of an important public policy tool.  Furthermore, the price elasticity of alcohol demand can be recovered 
from the tax elasticity based on the percent of the tax represented in the price and the tax pass-through 
rate.  Data on the state-level excise tax for beer are obtained from the Brewers' Almanac, published 
annually by the U.S. Brewers' Association.   
                                                 
20 The nominal federal excise tax on beer has remained constant since 1991, after increasing from $9 to 
$18 per gallon that year.  Shifts in the real value of the federal excise tax will be captured in the time 
dummy variables.    
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  In order to control for state-level sentiment related to alcohol regulation and other policy shifts 
concurrent to taxes, three additional measures are included in the specifications.  The first is a 
dichotomous indicator for those states that control the wholesaling and/or retailing of distilled spirits.
21  
The second measure represents the percent of the state population residing in dry counties where there 
is no sale of alcoholic beverages (available from the Brewers Almanac).  A dichotomous indicator is also 
created for whether the given state had an effective 0.08 BAC per se law in the month and year that the 
respondent was interviewed.  In these states, it is illegal to drive or operate a motor vehicle with a BAC at 
or above 0.08 percent in and of itself, and impairment does not need to be demonstrated.  As of July 
2004, all states plus D.C. had adopted these laws.  However, since the sample period covers 1992-2005, 
there was considerable variation due to the timing of when the laws were enacted in each state (National 
Conference of State Legislatures website). 
  Weighted means for the full HRS and PSID samples along with stratification by risk tolerance are 
presented in Table 1.  Risk-tolerant individuals are found to have a significantly higher prevalence of 
drinking as well as higher daily consumption.  There are also important differences in risk tolerance 
across demographic groups.  For instance, males are relatively more risk tolerant as are Whites.  Risk-
tolerant individuals are also less likely to be married, and their schooling distribution is shifted more 
towards higher levels of education.  Both the PSID and the HRS show that risk tolerance is similarly 
positively correlated with parental education.  Among older risk-tolerant individuals, more are likely to be 
unemployed and fewer are currently working or retired.  Income also seems to increase with risk 
tolerance, consistent with a higher average return for individuals who may be bearing greater risks 
through self-employment or working in riskier occupations.  There is some evidence across both age 
groups that risk-tolerant individuals have fewer indications of physical illnesses, but a higher indication of 
depression.  It is noteworthy that certain characteristics of the state or residence also vary across risk-
averse and risk-tolerant groups.  For instance, those who are risk averse are more likely to reside in 
states with stricter alcohol regulations: higher alcohol taxes, more likely to have enacted BAC 0.08 laws, 
higher percentage of the population residing in dry counties, and state monopoly on retailing and 
wholesaling of alcoholic beverages.  While these simple correlations may reflect other observed and 
                                                 
21 Over the sample period, there are 18 such monopoly states: AL, IA, ID, ME, MI, MS, MT, NH, NC, OH, 
OR, PA, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, and WY.    
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unobserved factors, they also point to risk tolerance as a potential confounder in an individual’s alcohol 
demand and its sensitivity to prices and policy.  The multivariate models presented in the next section 
account for these differences. 
V. Results 
  Table 2 presents estimates of the baseline specification in equation (2), for adults (ages 21-54) 
based on the PSID and older adults (ages 55 and up) based on the PSID and the HRS.  The first column 
estimates a basic model for adults utilizing a sparse set of covariates.  Beer tax has a significant and 
negative effect on current alcohol participation, with the tax participation elasticity estimated at -0.04.  
This specification controls for unobserved state sentiment towards alcohol regulation by including 
indicators for the BAC 0.08 per se law and for whether the state controls the retailing and / or wholesaling 
of alcoholic beverage.  The percent of the state population residing in dry counties is also included.  
Enactment of the BAC 0.08 law significantly reduces current drinking as does residing in a state with 
more dry counties.  For instance, a 10 percent increase in the population residing in dry counties is 
associated with a four percentage point decline in the probability of drinking.  These regulations raise the 
non-monetary cost of consuming alcohol, through higher penalties and search or time costs, and 
therefore reduce alcohol participation. Residing in a monopoly state that controls the distribution of spirits 
seems to increase the probability of drinking.  This may reflect substitution from the consumption of spirits 
to the consumption of beer or wine (Nelson, 2003; Holden and Wagenaar, 1990).  Even if total ethanol 
consumption is lower in monopoly states, higher alcohol participation may be reflecting higher beer 
consumption relative to liquor. 
  Since the PSID analysis is based on three waves, it is not feasible to control for unobserved state 
sentiment through state-level fixed effects.  There is not sufficient variation in the excise tax rate within 
each state over this period to allow for the fixed effects.  For example, regressing the tax on state and 
year fixed effects yields an R-squared of 0.99, suggesting that only about one percent of the variation in 
taxes represents within-state variation.   Hence, specification 1 proxies for unobserved state sentiment 
through other measures of alcohol regulation.  Specification 2 controls for state-level fixed effects for 
comparison.  As expected, the lack of state-specific time-series variation results in imprecision, inflating 
the standard error for the tax effect.  However, it is somewhat reassuring that the magnitude of the effect    
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and the elasticity remain similar.  Subsequent models utilizing the PSID omit the state fixed effects in 
favor of a more parsimonious set of controls for state sentiment. 
  Specification 3 expands on the basic model by incorporating risk aversion, labor market behavior, 
parental education, and health measures.  Risk-averse individuals have a significantly lower probability of 
current alcohol participation relative to those who are more tolerant of risk. Unadjusted means showed a 
difference in participation by about 11 percentage points.  In the multivariate model, this effect diminishes, 
though still remaining sizeable at 5.8 percentage points.  The tax elasticity is significantly negative and 
remains stable at -0.04.   
  Demographic variations in alcohol demand are often taken for granted and attributed to 
differences in tastes or culture.  However, incorporation of risk tolerance in the alcohol demand function 
can inform on some of these differences.  For instance, males participate more in drinking.  However, 
after controlling for risk tolerance in specification 3, the marginal effect of being male on participation 
declines by over two percentage points.
22  This is consistent with males being more tolerant of risk, as 
indicated by the simple means.  Similarly, it is true that non-Whites have been consistently found to have 
a lower drinking prevalence.  Part of this effect may reflect differences in attitudes towards risk, especially 
for Blacks who are more likely to be risk averse.  Similarly, while married individuals drink less, the effect 
magnitude is diminished upon controlling for risk since married individuals tend to be relatively more risk 
averse. 
  Educated individuals are more likely to participate in drinking, though here also the effect 
magnitude diminishes for those who have completed college since there is a positive association between 
risk tolerance and education.  There is a small significantly positive effect of income on drinking, with the 
elasticity estimated at 0.10.
23  The coefficients on the age categories confirm that drinking prevalence 
declines with age.  Relative to individuals not in the labor force (disabled, homemakers, students), those 
who are employed, unemployed, or retired also have higher alcohol participation.  Drinking is negatively 
associated with household size.  This may reflect lower drinking prevalence in households with children 
present or in family units, where the individual may be internalizing the external costs of their drinking on 
                                                 
22 Specification 3 also controls for health measures, which may have confounded prior estimates of 
demographic effects.  However, in comparing specification 3 to an equivalent model excluding risk 
tolerance, the patterns remain similar. 
23 Since the dependent variable captures any alcohol participation, this net income effect reflects both a    
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household members.  For the PSID sample, the effects of health measures are generally insignificant.  
This may be due to the low prevalence of some of these illnesses in the adult population, or it may reflect 
that at least for younger adults (21-54), these health outcomes may not have consistent effects on 
drinking propensity.  For older adults (below), these health conditions lead to significant reduction in 
alcohol participation. 
  Specifications 4 and 5 estimate the demand function for adults 55 years of age and older, based 
on the HRS.  Since the HRS sample is observed for a maximum of seven waves (1992-2005), there is 
sufficient variation in excise taxes within states over this period to allow for state fixed effects.  Increases 
in the beer tax significantly reduce current drinking among older adults.  Furthermore, the older 
demographic appears to be far more price-sensitive relative to younger adults; the tax elasticity is about 
four to five times larger and is estimated at between -0.17 and -0.22.  To ascertain that this increase in 
the tax response relative to the younger demographic is not an artifact of the sampling differences 
between the PSID and the HRS, a similar specification is also estimated for the PSID restricted to older 
adults.  Specification 6 suggests that the estimated marginal effect and elasticity are robust across both 
the PSID and the HRS samples.  These estimates indicate that drinking among older adults is more 
sensitive to prices, relative to the general population.
24 
  The simple means suggest that older risk-averse individuals have a lower prevalence of drinking 
by about 5.4 percentage points.  Specification 6 shows that while the effect diminishes somewhat after 
controlling for other confounders, it remains significant at 3.3 percentage points.  The effects of the other 
covariates are generally similar to those discussed above.   
  The next set of specifications reported in Table 3 explore whether response to taxes varies 
across risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals across both age groups.  These models estimate 
equations (3) and (4), stratifying the samples based on risk tolerance.  For both age groups, increases in 
the beer tax significantly reduce alcohol participation, with higher elasticities being estimated for the older 
demographic as before.  Among younger adults from the PSID, the marginal effect of the tax is relatively 
similar for both risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals.
25  A likelihood-ratio (LR) test was implemented to 
                                                                                                                                                             
positive income effect for moderate drinking and a potentially negative effect for heavy drinking.   
24 This may reflect a change in beverage composition among older drinkers, who may prefer wine or 
spirits over beer, relative to younger drinkers. 
25 Similarly, the marginal effects for the policy measures including Percent Dry and Monopoly state are    
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check if the marginal effect is significantly different across both risk aversion categories;
26  there is no 
significant difference.   For older adults in the HRS, the marginal effect and the tax elasticity suggest that 
risk-tolerant individuals may be more sensitive to prices relative to those who are more risk averse.  
However, this difference is not statistically significant based on the LR test.  These estimates suggest that 
even among groups that are more likely to consume and abuse alcohol, demand is relatively sensitive to 
prices. 
Specification Checks 
  The models thus far have considered the response of taxes at the extensive margin, on the 
decision to currently consume alcohol.  Policies may also affect the intensity of consumption, conditional 
on being a drinker.  Data on average daily number of drinks consumed from the HRS allow estimation of 
the alcohol demand function at the intensive margin.  Specification 1 in Table 4 suggests that taxes can 
also reduce the level of alcohol consumption, though the consumption elasticity (-0.086) is smaller in 
magnitude compared to the participation elasticity for older adults.  This is consistent with demand studies 
for the general population, which have also found larger elasticities at the extensive margin;  that is, most 
of the price effect operates through the decision to drink rather than the level of drinking conditional on 
participation (Chaloupka et al., 2002; NIAAA, 2000; Manning, 1995).  Risk aversion continues to be a 
significant predictor of alcohol consumption.  Across models 1 and 2, risk-averse drinkers consume 
between 5.5 and 8.6 percent less alcohol.   
Model 2 also allows for the tax effect at the intensive margin to differ between the risk categories.  
Since alcohol participation among older adults is about 35 percent, estimating the conditional demand 
significantly restricts the sample size.  Thus, a parsimonious specification, which includes an interaction 
term between the beer tax and risk aversion, is employed to allow any difference in the tax effect.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive, suggesting that risk-tolerant individuals may be more 
sensitive to taxes.  However, the large standard error on the interaction effect does not allow the rejection 
                                                                                                                                                             
also stable across both risk groups. 
26 This test is performed by estimating a model with all individuals, and including interaction terms for all 
variables except the alcohol policy and also including the risk aversion indicator. The LR test is carried 
out by comparing the values of the log-likelihood function with and without the restrictions imposed:   LR = 
-2[ln L* - ln L RISK AVERSE - ln L RISK TOLERANT].  If the restriction is valid as under the null hypothesis, then 
imposing it should not lead to a large reduction in the log-likelihood function for the overall sample (ln L*).  
The ratio is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-squared density function with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of restrictions, which is one because only the alcohol tax coefficient is restricted.    
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of the null that the tax response is similar across both groups.  This is consistent with the alcohol 
participation models which also followed the same pattern. 
While these results suggest that excise taxes do have an impact on the level of alcohol use, 
across both risk groups, it is specifically problem drinking that imposes externalities and is the target of 
public policy.  Specifications 3 and 4 therefore examine the tax response on chronic drinking, conditional 
on being a current drinker.  Chronic drinking is defined by a dichotomous indicator for whether the 
respondent consumes more than two drinks daily, on average.
27  Approximately 10 percent of drinkers in 
the HRS fall in this category.  The estimated tax elasticity is significantly negative and of a similar 
magnitude to the participation elasticity among all individuals.  The interaction effect in model 4 is 
insignificant, suggesting that taxes can reduce the propensity of chronic alcohol use even among risk-
tolerant individuals.  Risk aversion has a negative effect on problem consumption, though the coefficients 
are imprecisely estimated.  Unadjusted means show that the prevalence of chronic drinking is significantly 
higher among risk-tolerant individuals by about 10 percent.      
  Specification 5 exploits the longitudinal waves of the HRS and restricts the sample to ever-
drinkers.  This results in a slight difference in the control group that is used for identification of the tax 
response.  That is, among those individuals who drink, some may shift in and out of current drinking 
status.  This model checks whether this response is related to changes in the excise tax.  Thus, 
individuals who never drink and therefore do not change their drinking status over the sample period are 
excluded.  The tax elasticity declines somewhat in magnitude from -0.17 to -0.10.  This is presumably 
because current drinking propensity for ever-drinkers is less responsive to prices.  Also, in the prior 
specification, never-drinkers served as part of the control group against which to compare the responses 
of those who do drink.  By excluding the never-drinkers, ever-drinkers who change their alcohol 
participation are being compared to those who do not.  Employing this alternative control group for 
identification, the tax elasticity of older adults continues to be larger in magnitude relative to younger 
adults. 
  Economic models of addiction typically predict that current consumption depends on past 
consumption (as a proxy for the accumulated addictive stock) due to the reinforcement effect.  Thus, 
                                                 
27 Redefining the chronic use indicator to reflect more than 3 drinks daily does not significantly alter the 
results.  The elasticity magnitude declines to about -0.20 and the standard errors inflate due to the lower    
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current addictive consumption would also be a function of past prices.
28  Specification 6 includes both the 
current and the one-year lagged excise tax.  Since excise taxes within a state are highly correlated over 
time due to infrequent changes, the standard errors are substantially inflated.   However, judging from the 
magnitudes, the current and lagged tax effects in specification 6 almost add up to the current tax effect in 
specification 5 that excludes the lagged excise tax.  This suggests that the contemporaneous tax 
response may also be picking up the effect of past taxes, and may in some sense be more indicative of 
the long-run elasticity that takes account of changes in past and present prices on current consumption.   
  While the estimates and differences have been interpreted with respect to the economist’s 
concept of risk aversion, one potential concern is that the risk instrument may be reflecting differences in 
time preference rather than attitudes towards risk per se.  Theoretically, some of the effects of risk 
tolerance are difficult to disentangle from the effects of differential discount rates.  For instance, more 
present-oriented individuals with a high discount rate would also be predicted to participate more in risky 
activities such as alcohol and cigarette use since they are likely to discount the future harmful 
consequences.  From a policy perspective, it is immaterial whether the risk-tolerant group is reflecting a 
more dismissive attitude towards risk or a higher discount rate.  Since these individuals, regardless of 
whether they are risk-tolerant or present-oriented or both, are heavier consumers of alcohol, it is 
important to explore the extent to which their demand is sensitive to variations in taxes.  Nevertheless, for 
interpretation purposes, it may be helpful to determine that the risk tolerance instrument is indeed picking 
up variation in attitudes towards risk.   
The HRS administered a module on preferred consumption paths to 198 respondents in order to 
elicit estimates of time preference parameters.  Barsky et al. (1997) show that for these individuals, their 
degree of risk aversion is uncorrelated with time preference.  Alternately, specifications 7-9 in Table 4 
also confirm that the risk tolerance categories are reflecting variations beyond discount rates.  Individuals 
in the HRS are also asked about their relevant financial planning horizon.  While certainly prone to 
                                                                                                                                                             
prevalence of this measure of heavy use. 
28 This is the case for myopic addiction wherein the individual maximizes current utility and does not 
consider future consequences.  With rational addiction, wherein the individual maximizes lifetime utility, 
current consumption depends on past and future consumption (Becker and Murphy, 1988).  Hence, 
demand would also be a function of future prices in addition to contemporaneous and lagged prices.  
Since the focus of this study is on risk tolerance and differences in responses across risk tolerance, the 
rational addiction framework is abstracted from.  Empirically identifying the effects of current, past, and 
future prices is complicated by the collinearity in the price series.    
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measurement error and noise, variations in the planning horizon, conditional on age, would partially 
reflect differences in time preference.  Accounting for age, more future-oriented individuals with lower 
discount rates should take greater account of future events and therefore have more distant planning 
horizons.  The marginal effects and elasticity estimates remain robust to controlling for the individual’s 
reported planning horizon.  The tax elasticity for older adults continues to be larger than younger adults, 
and there are no significant differences in the tax response across risk groups.  Combined with earlier 
evidence that the risk tolerance module correctly predicts behaviors that it would be expected to predict a 
priori (self-employment, insurance status, etc.), there is some evidence that the measure is indeed 
indicative of an individual’s propensity to undertake risk. 
Sample Attrition 
Selective sample attrition is not a concern with the PSID sample since the analysis employs only 
three waves (1999-2003) and the demographic of interest comprises young adults in relatively good 
health.   In the HRS, however, selective attrition may be relevant due to the longer period of study and the 
older demographic.  The average mortality rate between waves is 2.3 percent.  Thus, about 14 percent of 
the individuals who were surveyed in the first wave (1992) have died by the seventh wave (2004).  The 
mortality rate for the HRS sample is consistent with the Social Security Administration life table mortality 
rates (Kapteyn et al., 2006).   
The specific concern is that since alcohol-related illnesses are a significant cause of premature 
death, mortality among the heavy drinkers may lead to a progressively selective sample in later waves 
that consumes less alcohol.  Results thus far consistently indicate that older adults are far more 
responsive to tax policies than younger adults.  It is important to determine if this effect is being driven by 
attrition bias.  If the heavier drinkers, who may be less responsive to price, are being progressively 
excluded from the sample, then the remaining price response may be biased upwards.  Controlling for 
physical and mental health status alleviates some of this concern.  Table 5 also presents two additional 
strategies to inform on potential bias due to such attrition. 
First, specifications 1-3 utilize a balanced sample that only includes individuals who are observed 
in all seven waves.  If selective attrition is severe, then results from the unbalanced panel (Tables 2 and 
3) versus the balanced panel would be expected to be different.  Comparing the marginal effects and tax 
elasticities from the balanced panel to those reported earlier, there are no material differences.    
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 The second approach employs inverse probability weights (IPW) to adjust for selection bias due 
to observable characteristics (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1998).  This involves using baseline 
characteristics (gender, race, ethnicity, education, parental education, religion, and native-born) along 
with other time-varying factors (age indicators, wave indicators, census division indicators) and lagged 
covariates (income, marital status, and health insurance) to predict survival status.  Most importantly, 
observed illness conditions in the previous wave and the number of drinks consumed in the previous 
wave are also included to predict survival.  Since past health status is observed, this model is able to 
correctly predict about 77 percent of the attritors, based on a very conservative cutoff of 0.9 for the 
predicted probability; with the standard cutoff of 0.5, the prediction rate is 92 percent.  The IPW correction 
involves weighting observations by 1/pi, where pi represents the probability of survival, therefore giving 
more weight in the regression to those individuals whose observable characteristics predict higher 
attrition rates.  The results in specifications 4-6 show that the elasticity magnitudes decline somewhat as 
expected, since attrition bias may have inflated the price response.  However, the general pattern of 
results and conclusions remains unaffected. 
 VI.  Discussion 
  Economists have long recommended increases in the price of alcohol as a tool to reduce 
consumption and related external costs.  However, these recommendations have generally been based 
on studies of the overall population or limited demographic subgroups.  Specifically, there have been no 
prior studies that have considered the drinking behavior of the older demographic.  Given the aging of the 
population combined with an increased potential for alcohol-related harms, it is important to study 
whether older adults respond to tax policies and to what extent.  This study is the first to provide 
estimates comparing the tax response of younger and older adults.  Results indicate that not only is 
alcohol use (participation, intensity, and heavy drinking) among older adults responsive to taxes, but 
these adults also have much higher tax elasticities compared to younger adults.  Thus, higher excise 
taxes would be particularly effective in curtailing use for this sub-population. 
  While the analysis in this study focused on state-level excise taxes to provide direct estimates of 
an important policy tool, the tax elasticity can also be translated into the price elasticity for comparison.  
Specifically, if taxes are passed through to prices at a rate of α, then the following characterizes the 
relation between the price elasticity εP and the tax elasticity εT (Kenkel, 2005):   εP = εT (α * T/P)
-1    
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If α is one, as would be the case under competitive conditions, then a one-cent increase in the tax  would 
lead to a corresponding one-cent increase in price.  Under monopolistic conditions, with a constant 
elasticity demand curve, α would exceed one.  Indeed studies have generally found the pass-through rate 
to be larger than one, on the order of 1.6 to 2 or more (Kenkel, 2005; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 
2002).  Employing an α of 1.5 and noting that excise taxes account for about eight to nine percent of the 
price of beer, the price elasticity can be determined by multiplying the tax elasticity by a factor of 7.4.  
Thus, the participation elasticity for younger adults (ages 21-54) is between -0.31 and -0.37.  Adults ages 
55 and older have a much larger price response, with the participation price elasticity estimated at 
between -1.28 and -1.63.  Furthermore, their conditional consumption elasticity is between -0.64 and -
0.81.  Thus, older adults appear to be among the most price sensitive of all demographic subgroups.   
Estimates of the alcohol demand function and the price elasticity have also abstracted from 
important person-specific differences in personality traits such as attitudes towards risk.  At worst, these 
individual-level differences are not accounted for at all, and at best, they are purged through individual 
fixed effects.  No prior study has specifically incorporated the economist’s concept of risk tolerance into 
the empirical demand function.  Accounting for risk can partially explain some persisting demographic 
variations previously attributed to tastes or culture.  For instance, drinking prevalence is partly higher 
among males due to a higher tolerance towards risk.  Similarly, a higher degree of risk aversion among 
Blacks and married individuals can also partially explain why these individuals are less likely to consume 
alcohol.  Future research may benefit from considering the confounding effects of risk tolerance on other 
risky health behaviors, particularly smoking. 
Since risk-tolerant individuals are found to participate more in drinking and have a higher level of 
consumption, it is also important to determine whether their alcohol use responds to tax policy.  This 
group, through their higher consumption, also bears a greater share of the responsibility of the societal 
costs of alcohol abuse.  There are some indications that while overall drinking prevalence remained 
stable over the past decade, problem drinking may be trending upwards.  Data from the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) show that the median prevalence of binge drinking has increased 
from 14.4 percent (1992) to 16.1 percent (2002).  Similarly, chronic drinking has also increased from 3.0    
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to 5.9 percent over this period.
29  Since the majority of drinkers consume alcohol safely with little external 
harm, the rationale for higher taxes falls on whether high-participation groups curb their consumption in 
response to higher costs.  There is a tradeoff in terms of the social gains from making heavy users face 
higher prices that reflect the full social costs of their drinking versus the burden of higher prices on 
moderate drinkers (Manning et al., 2005).  If, for instance, risk-tolerant individuals are not price-sensitive 
then increasing taxes may have a greater proportional effect on light or moderate drinkers and would not 
be effective in reducing alcohol-related harms.  Estimates from this study, however, suggest that this is 
not the case;  risk-tolerant individuals are just as responsive to excise taxes relative to risk-averse 
individuals, if not more.  These results therefore strengthen the rationale for raising alcohol excise taxes 
as a policy tool for deterring use among groups likely to over-consume alcohol.   
     
                                                 
29 Binge drinking in the BRFSS is defined as having 5 or more drinks on a single occasion, at least once 
in the past month.  Chronic drinking is defined as consuming more than two drinks daily for males and 
more than one drink daily for females.  These rates correspond to individuals 18 years of age and older.      
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Table 1 
Weighted Sample Means 
PSID and HRS 
 
PSID: Ages 21 – 54  HRS: Ages 55 and older   
Variable 
 



























Average number of drinks consumed 
daily 









State excise tax on beer, adjusted by 















Dichotomous indicator for high degree 
of risk aversion 
0.4293 
(0.4950) 
_ _  0.6388 
(0.4803) 
_ _ 








































PSID: Dichotomous indicator for race 
other than Black, White or Hispanic 
HRS: Dichotomous indicator for race 




























Dichotomous indicator for highest level 















Dichotomous indicator for highest level 















Dichotomous indicator for highest level 















PSID: Dichotomous indicator for 








_ _ _ 
Real Income 
Income from all sources, adjusted by 
























































































PSID: Dichotomous indicator for 
whether mother or father is a college 
graduate 
HRS: Dichotomous indicator for 
whether mother and father have 
















PSID: Count of the difficulties 
associated with: 1) bathing, 2) dressing, 
3) eating, 4) walking, 5) getting outside 
HRS: Count of the difficulties 
associated with: 1) walking 1 block, 2) 
walking several blocks, 3) walking 
across a room, 4) climbing 1 flight of 















Dichotomous indicator for whether 
respondent has been diagnosed with 














Dichotomous indicator for whether 
















Dichotomous indicator for whether 















Dichotomous indicator for whether 














PSID: Number of depression-related 
symptoms in the past month: 1) sad, 2) 
nervous, 3) restless, 4) hopeless 
HRS: Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression Scale; Sum of mental 
health symptoms in the past week: 1) 
depressed, 2) everything an effort, 3) 
restless sleep, 4) not happy, 5) lonely, 














BAC 08  Dichotomous indicator for whether the 
state has an effective 0.08 BAC per se 













Percent Dry  Percent of state population residing in 















Dichotomous indicator for whether the 
















Dichotomous indicator for whether the 
respondent’s relevant financial planning 















Dichotomous indicator for whether the 
respondent’s relevant financial planning 












Observations  27,531 4,430  5,280  101,477 43,487  23,449 
Notes: Means are weighted by the sampling weights.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Number 
of observations listed represents the maximum number.  For some variables, the actual sample size is 
less due to missing information.  Asterisks denote that the difference in means between the Risk Averse 
and Risk Tolerant samples is statistically significant as follows: *** significant at the one-percent level, ** 
significant at the five-percent level, * significant at the ten-percent level. 
1 Due to a large number of missing observations for education in the PSID, a separate category for 
missing information is created.  Thus, the appropriate means for high school, some college, and college 
should be interpreted with respect to the percent of non-missing observations.  
 
 





PSID and HRS 
 
Sample  Ages 21 - 54  Ages 55 and older 
Dataset  PSID PSID PSID HRS HRS PSID 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Real Beer Tax  -0.1588*** 
(0.0445) 
[ε = -0.037] 
-0.2198 
(0.2200) 
[ε = -0.050] 
-0.1877*** 
(0.0735) 
[ε = -0.042] 
-0.5308*** 
(0.1247) 
[ε = -0.224] 
-0.4525*** 
(0.1618) 
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_ _  -0.0423 
(0.0319) 












_ _  0.0146 
(0.0334) 
Year Indicators  Yes***  Yes** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes 
State 
Indicators 
No Yes*** No Yes***  Yes*** No 
Pseudo R




0.625 0.634 0.657 0.672 0.680 0.672 
Observations 26,762 26,762 9,545  107,509  66,374 1,935 
Notes: Specifications are estimated via Probit, and marginal effects are reported.  Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered robust.  Tax elasticities, evaluated at the sample means, are reported in 
brackets.  Significance is denoted as follows: *** significant at the one-percent level ** significant at the 
five-percent level * significant at the ten-percent level.  Significance of the tax effect is based on a one-
tailed test.  Percent correctly classified is calculated using a cutoff based on the observed mean 




Stratified by Risk Preference 
 
PSID: Ages 21 - 54  HRS: Ages 55 and older  Sample 
Risk Averse  Risk Tolerant  Risk Averse  Risk Tolerant 
Variable  1 2 3 4 
Real Beer Tax  -0.2157** 
(0.1094) 
[ε = -0.056] 
-0.1822** 
(0.0977) 
[ε = -0.037] 
-0.3863** 
(0.1942) 
[ε = -0.159] 
-0.5987** 
(0.2902) 
















































































































































































Age Indicators  Yes  Yes**  Yes***  Yes*** 
Year Indicators  Yes**  Yes  Yes***  Yes***    
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State Indicators  No  No  Yes***  Yes*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.077 0.100 0.143 0.153 
Percent Correctly 
Classified 
0.636 0.664 0.675 0.686 
Observations 4,355  5,190  43,181  23,183 
Notes: See Table 2   
  35
Table 4 
HRS: Older Adults  
Specification Checks 
 
Ever Drinkers  Time Preference   
Sample 
 






All Risk  Averse  Risk 
Tolerant 



























































[ε = -0.208] 





















_ _ _ _ _ 
Planning Horizon 5-10 
years 






Planning Horizon 10+ 
years 






Year Indicators  Yes**  Yes**  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
State  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes*** Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.080  0.080  0.083  0.083  0.141 0.141 0.130 0.131 0.135 
Percent Correctly 
Classified 
-  -  0.610  0.609  0.674 0.674 0.675 0.673 0.670 
Observations 24,635  24,635  24,612  24,612  46,212 46,212 54,237 35,423 18,796 
Notes: See Table 2.  Each column represents a separate regression model.  All specifications include the extended set of covariates listed in 
Table 2.  
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Table 5 




Balanced Sample  Inverse Probability Weighting 
1 
Sample 
All Risk  Averse  Risk 
Tolerant 
All Risk  Averse  Risk 
Tolerant 












Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Real Beer Tax 
-0.5871*** 
(0.1998) 
[ε = -0.219] 
-0.5446** 
(0.2398) 
[ε = -0.217] 
-0.6751** 
(0.3621) 
[ε = -0.224] 
-0.3671** 
(0.1797) 
[ε = -0.147] 
-0.2902* 
(0.2115) 
[ε = -0.125] 
-0.5451* 
(0.3331) 
[ε = -0.185] 
Year Indicators  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
State Indicators  Yes***  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2  0.151 0.153 0.130 0.137 0.134 0.146 
Percent Correctly 
Classified 
0.684 0.684 0.686 0.676 0.676 0.677 
Observations  40,599 26,544 14,036 55,137 35,740 19378 
Notes: See Table 2.  Each column represents a separate regression model.  All models include the 
extended set of covariates listed in Table 2. 
1 Inverse probability weights are predicted using baseline characteristics (gender, race, ethnicity, 
education, parental education, religion, and native-born) along with other time-varying factors (age 
indicators, wave indicators, census division indicators), lagged covariates (income, marital status, health 





Alcohol Prevalence (Past Month Use)
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0.38 0.39
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Appendix 1 
Risk Tolerance Module 
 
Classification of individuals into four ordinal categories of risk tolerance is derived from the 
following questions asked in the HRS and the PSID modules. 
 
1)  Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life.  You are given 
the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double 
your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third.  
Would you take the new job? 
 
 
If the answer to the first question is “Yes,” then the interviewer continues to another hypothetical scenario 
that increases the amount of income loss from a third to ha half. 
 
2)  Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 
that it would cut it in half.  Would you still take the new job? 
 
 
If the answer to the first question is “No,” then the interviewer presents another scenario similar to (1) but 
with a lower income loss (from a third to 20 percent). 
 
3)  Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 
that it would cut it by 20 percent.  Would then take the new job? 
 
 
The most risk-averse individuals answer “No” to questions (1) and (3), rejecting both the one-third 
and one-fifth income loss scenarios.  The second most risk-averse group of individuals answers “No” to 
question (1) and “Yes” to question (3); they reject the income loss of one-third but accept the scenario 
with an income loss of one-fifth.  The third group (with a lower degree of risk aversion) answers “Yes” to 
question (1), accepting the one-third income loss, but answers “No” to question (2), rejecting the one-half 
income loss.  The fourth group comprising of the most risk-tolerant individuals answer “Yes” to both 
questions (1) and (2), accepting both the one-third and one-half income loss scenarios. 
  In the PSID, the module includes these three scenarios along with two others that probe with 
higher and lower income losses relative to (2) and (3) respectively.  If the individual answers “Yes” to 
question (2) willing to accept the risk of a one-half income loss, then he/she is asked about a scenario 
with a three-fourths income loss:    
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4)  Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double [your/your 




If the individual answers “No” to question (3), unwilling to accept an income loss of one-fifth, then he/she 
is asked about a scenario with a potential income loss of ten percent. 
 
5)  Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double [your/your family] 
income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 10 percent. Then, would you take the new job? 
 
 
Thus, in the PSID, individuals can be divided into six ordinal categories of risk aversion; the two extra 
categories separate out the most risk-averse and the most risk-tolerant (categories 1 and 4) further.  
However, to ensure consistency with the four-category classification employed in the HRS, questions (4) 





Income Cut by 1/3 
 




    ( 2 )       ( 3 )  
   Income  Cut  by  1/2    Income Cut by 1/5     
 
  




 ( 4 )           ( 5 )  
Income  Cut  by  3/4       Income  Cut  by  1/10   
 
 





Category 4b  Category 4a      Category 1b          Category 1a 
 
 
Category 1a represents the most risk-averse individuals, and Category 4b represents the most risk-
tolerant individuals.  For this study, a dichotomous indicator is defined for risk-averse individuals who fall    
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in Category 1, relative to all others.  The distinction between 1a versus 1b, and 4a versus 4b can only be 
made in the PSID.  The following distribution of individuals results across the four divisions in the PSID 
and the HRS. 
 Table  A1 
Distribution of Risk Aversion 
Risk Classification  PSID (Ages 21-54)  HRS (Ages 55+) 
Category 1 (Most Risk-Averse)  42.9  63.9 
Category 2  15.4  13.1 
Category 3  18.6  10.3 
Category 4 (Most Risk-Tolerant)  23.0  12.7 
Observations 9,710  118,902 
  Note: Frequencies are weighted by the sampling weight. 